Carnap’s four tests

Carnap’s four tests

Carnap (1950) proposes four  tests to judge the significance of the new explicit knowledge derived through explication.  In summary these tests are:

  1. similarity:
    prima facie it should be obvious that the newly discovered explicit knowledge relates to and arises from the implicit knowledge which prompted the explication;
  2. exactness:
    by evidence and argumentation, it should be possible to relate the newly discovered or explicit knowledge within a “well-connected system of scientific concepts”;
  3. fruitfulness:
    the newly discovered or explicit knowledge should be “fruitful”, capable of offering new knowledge and insights valuable to science and to scientific progress;
  4. simplicity:
    the newly discovered or explicit knowledge should as simple as possible in support of the previous three tests.

Assuming the newly discovered knowledge passes all of these four tests, then it is possible to argue that the new knowledge has face validity and, subject to disaffirmation, a chance to be regarded as a significant contribution to knowledge.

Reference

Carnap, R. (1950). Logical foundations of probability, University of Chicago Press, Illinois.

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Franklin. Dealing with implicit knowledge

If explication can only proceed on the basis that there already exists some form of implicit knowledge, it is sensible to inquire what is meant by implicit knowledge.

According to Baker, implicit knowledge is something which is present but is “not ‘out in plain view.’ ”  Like other writers, Baker uses metaphor to illustrate this proposition.  He writes:

If we want a more specific concrete image still to remind us of all this,we can think of a bud on a stem as an example of something that is mostly ‘implicit’: only the outer leaf is ‘explicit.’  When the bud blossoms, it performs a kind of ‘self-explication.’  If we want to see what’s inside before this comes about, our ‘explication’ of it would have to take the form of dissection.

Initially comforting, perhaps, the metaphor and the related analysis cannot be taken at face value because the metaphor holds implicit assumptions about both (a) our prior knowledge of the implicit, and (b) our prior knowledge of what we might expect to discover (and hence attempt to unwrap) inside the bud.

Let me explain.

For someone who has no prior knowledge about, or who has no prior experience relating to a flower bud, the only knowledge which that individual can be said to possess is the experience of seeing the bud.  As this is the first time the individual has ever seen a flower bud, then the individual has no simple or obvious way of telling herself or others what it is, or what the bud contains. For sure, the individual can (probably) be expected to describe the object, but without obtaining further knowledge (such as appealing for advice) or further experience (such as physically holding, touching, pinching the flower bud), the implicit is not defined by the explicit alone.  Rather, the implicit is defined by the explicit in the context of the individual’s prior experience and knowledge which, in turn, will shape the questions, hunches and guesses she will make about the nature (and contents) of the implicit.

This argument is consistent with the proposition that meanings are “perspectival, contextual, and contingent” (Best and Kellner, 1997: 260).  As implicit knowledge is defined by the explicit in the context of the individual’s prior experience and knowledge, and as individuals can be expected to possess different prior experience and knowledge, then it follows that when explicating the same identical object (in this case a bud on a stem), different individuals will end up with different explicit knowledge.  And at that stage, from the perspective of each explicant, their new explicit knowledge is as valid as the next person’s.

Implicit knowledge, then, is contingent knowledge.  Being contingent, an individual’s implicit knowledge is, in principle, open to further analysis. For instance, the possible dissection of a bud on a stem (cf. Baker) brings into focus the technologies and techniques available to those who want to reveal more about the implicit.  Again we can argue that the application of identical technologies and techniques by individuals will lead to different outcomes according to the prior knowledge and the technical skills of the explicator. For sure the process of (say) dissection of the implicit is likely to reduce the amount of variation, but unless it is possible to replicate precisely every explication of the implicit, there will always remain some differences in the
explicit knowledge derived through explication.

As we embellish this argument, however, we also have to be careful not to make the assumption that everybody will have the same objective when seeking to dissect the implicit.  Some may be content with developing an understanding of the relationship between the bud and the stem; others might be concerned only with charting the changing properties of petals contained in the bud; others might want to get a sense of the chemical changes taking place.  The point that I am arguing here is that the implicit knowledge that I possess about the bud on the stem is partly determined by my prior ‘will to know’ – and by my purpose in wanting to know more about the implicit.  As my will to know changes, then I can expect to want to find out more about the bud on the stem.  In that process, what was once implicit knowledge has become the base for further discovery; the implicit has become explicit and hence offers the prospect of new implicit knowledge and the opportunity of a new explication.

Based on these arguments, we can go on to deduce that process of explication has no natural final cut-off point. Every explication generates new explicit knowledge, and as new explicit knowledge is assumed to entail new implicit knowledge, this new knowledge is open to a new explication (now to be undertaken in the light of the experience of having completed prior explications).

© Peter Franklin. November 2006. Amended February 2012

Note: This web page is based on an extract from the following paper:

P. Franklin,(2006) “Explication as a philosophical enterprise”, Organisations and People, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 6-11.

References:
Baker, L. A. (1999). “Critical concepts: Explication versus analysis”. Kansas State University. (retrieved February 2012)

Best, S. and Kellner, D. (1997). The Postmodern Turn, London: The Guilford Press